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|  | Kennan (Containment), Feb. 1946 | Wallace (Compromise), July 1946 |
| Why have relations deteriorated between the US and USSR? | 1. Russians are instinctively insecure and will always try to undermine their rivals: “In general, all Soviet efforts … will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond [the] reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with [the] basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant.” | 1. American military buildup makes it seem like we are preparing for war: “These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coastlines, and we did not?” 2. “There is no question, as the Secretary of State has indicated, that negotiations with the Russians are difficult because of cultural differences, their traditional isolationism, and their insistence on a visible quid pro quo [that is, they must receive something in return for everything that they offer] in all agreements” |
| Why do Americans distrust the USSR? | 1. Because Americans haven’t been properly educated as to the realities of the Russian situation: “I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if the realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown...” | 1. “Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and economic organization. For the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a successful rival to democracy and free enterprise…” |
| Why do the Soviets distrust the US? | 1. Russianrulers have always feared foreign contact because they believed their system would suffer by comparison: “For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between [the] Western world and their own, feared what would happen if [the] Russians learned [the] truth about [the] world without [that is, the world outside Russia] or if foreigners learned the truth about the world within [Russia].” | 1. Russians see themselves as fighting for existence in a hostile world: “The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet Government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet State was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward.” 2. Our security measures seem aggressive not defensive: “I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history” 3. Our resistance to Soviet satellite states: “Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by and large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.” |
| What’s your greatest fear? | 1. That the US will become like the USSR: “the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” | 1. “the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world…In a world armed with atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of those weapons....” |
| What are your recommendations regarding US policy toward the Soviet Union? | 1. We must be strong and ready to use force: Soviet power usually withdraws when strong resistance is encountered. If an adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. 2. Western powers must be firmly united in their opposition to Soviet power. 3. The Soviet system is not yet proven and may collapse from within. Transfers of power and territorial expansion, for example, will put new strains on this untried system. 4. We must combat Soviet propaganda beyond the Soviet zone. 5. We must ensure domestic tranquility: “World communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue … Every courageous and incisive measure to solve [the] internal problems of our own society, to improve [the] self-confidence, discipline, morale, and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow….” 6. We must provide concrete guidance to unstable countries abroad: “Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by [the] experiences of the past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than the Russians to give them this. And unless we do, the Russians certainly will.” 7. We must have confidence in our own system and institutions: “After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” | 1. War with Russia would bring catastrophe to all mankind, and therefore we must find a way of living in peace. 2. “We cannot meet this challenge by [an alliance directed against the Soviet Union].” 3. “The fundamental objective…should be to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust.” 4. “We should be prepared to negotiate a treaty which will establish a definite sequence of events for the establishment of international control and development of atomic energy.” 5. “We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda…This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.” 6. “We should not act as if we too felt that we were threatened in today’s world. We are by far the most powerful nation in the world, the only Allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations.” 7. “It is certainly desirable that, as far as possible, we achieve unity on the home front with respect to our international relations; but unity on the basis of building up conflict abroad would prove to be not only unsound but disastrous. I think there is some reason to fear that in our earnest efforts to achieve bi-partisan unity in this country we may have given way too much to isolationism.” |

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|  | similarities | differences |
| Foreign policy  Can security be preserved by military means in a world armed with atomic weapons? |  | 1. communism and capitalism can/cannot peacefully coexist (containment vs. compromise)    1. Kennan (**containment**): we must be strong and ready to use force: Soviet power withdraws when strong resistance is encountered       1. implication: Western powers must be firmly united in their opposition to Soviet power (e.g. West Germany, West Berlin, NATO)       2. implication: we must provide concrete guidance to unstable countries abroad (Marshall Plan)    2. Wallace (**compromise**): we must find a way of living in peace: “We should be prepared, even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement, to agree to reasonable Russian guarantees of security”       1. implication: |
| Domestic policy  Will we become a police state? | 1. We should achieve unity at home    1. educate Americans about the reality of the Russian situation       1. hysterical anti-Sovietism (Kennan)       2. irrational fear of Russia (Wallace): “We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications.”    2. Be confident in our own institutions       1. don’t become like those we oppose (Kennan)       2. we can meet this challenge “without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties” (Wallace) |  |

EXEMPLAR (level 10)

**Topic sentence**: Kennan and Wallace’s arguments regarding US policy toward the Soviet Union are similar when it comes to domestic policy and

different when it comes to foreign policy.

**Support 1:** On the home front, both men feel that the American people have been misinformed about what is really going on inside the USSR, which has ended up creating more fear of the Russians than is reasonable, and both men feel it is important for Americans to stand together and be confident in the strength of their own political and economic institutions.

1. **Description** of their position:
   * We should educate the American public about the realities of the Russian threat.
2. **Explanation** of their position:
   * The Russian military, economy and political system are much weaker than the ours.
3. **Example** of their position:
   * “Gauged against the Western world as a whole,” Kennan writes, the “Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on [the] degree of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which [the] Western world can muster.”
4. **Implication** of their position:
   * Kennan feels that if the American public were to know how much more advanced the US military is than the Soviet military, how much stronger the US economy is compared with the Soviet economy, and how much more stable the American political system is than the Soviet system, then the people of the United States would attend to the Soviet threat with objectivity and detachment, the way a doctor “studies unruly and unreasonable individuals.”
   * On the other hand, a properly educated American public could pressure its government to invade and wipe out the Soviet threat while it is still weak and vulnerable, which would likely lead to a Third World War.
5. **Difference** (if any) between their positions: Here, there is little difference between Kennan and Wallace’s positions. However, while both men feel that American fear of the Soviet Union is either “irrational” (Wallace) or “hysterical” (Kennan), and that it is important for the American people to have faith in their own political and economic institutions and be united in their opposition of this threat—Kennan and Wallace’s motivations for wanting to create a properly informed America are quite different. Whereas Kennan sees such an informed and united public as a “diplomatic victory over Moscow,” Wallace hopes such a situation will slow the American military buildup that has been stimulated and supported by the American public’s belief in an exaggerated threat. A smaller show of strength would, in Wallace’s view, make the US appear less aggressive in the eyes of the international community and therefore less “hypocritical.” While both men’s domestic policy recommendations are the same, that is, educating the American public about the realities of the Russian threat, their motivations are drastically different: Wallace’s is compromise; Kennan’s is competition. Even in unifying the American public, Kennan’s motivation is essentially victory over the Soviet system. For him there could be no greater defeat for the US than becoming like the Soviets: “The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism,” he writes, “is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”

**Support 2:** But while differing motivations managed to result in similar domestic policies, the same cannot be said of Kennan and Wallace’s foreign policies, which are radically different.

1. **Description** of
   1. Kennan’s position: we must contain the spread of Soviet communism
   2. Wallace’s position: we must be prepared to compromise with the Soviets and meet some demands even if that means expansion.
2. **Explanation** of
   1. Kennan’s position: The Soviets cannot peacefully coexist with Western nations.
   2. Wallace’s position: We can peacefully coexist with the Russians.
3. **Example** of
   1. Kennan’s position: The Soviets will try to destabilize any rival nation by encouraging conflict: “All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents”
   2. Wallace’s position: “The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda . . . This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.”
4. **Implication** of
   1. Kennan’s position: we will probably have to use military force to prevent the spread of Soviet communism
   2. Wallace’s position: Soviet power will probably expand.
5. **Interpretation:**